The paper considers production in a simple two period general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. It shows, by application of convex sets analysis, the separation of economic activities of the agents. The paper improves on Stiefenhofer (2010) by taking a geometric approach to the study of the decentralization theorem. This theorem separates the economic activities of the agents, hence generalizes the objective function of the firm of the Arrow-Debreu model to the case of incomplete markets, where firms are profit maximizers.
Introduction
Drèze [2] , and Grossman and Hart [5] introduce objective functions of firms which are not independent of the utilities of their owners into the analysis of general equilibrium with incomplete markets. Thus, in their economic scenarios, firms are utility maximizers, and therefore, the economic activities of the agents centralized. This result is a consequence of the exogenous asset structure considered in their models.
Stiefenhofer [7] adds more structure to the economic model by endogenizing the firms' production sets. The novelty of this model is the generalization of the objective function of the firm of the Arrow-Debreu model to incomplete markets. This objective function is independent of the utility of the owners of the firm, hence, the economic decisions of the agents separated. This objective function has a nice property, it rehabilitates the profits maximization criterion of the Arrow-Debreu model [1] . This paper considers a geometric approach to the the separation theorem of economic activities of the agents in incomplete markets introduced in [7] . We apply convex sets analysis [3] to show the decentralization of the objective function of the firm of the model introduced in Stiefenhofer [6] . The asset structure of the leading case model is sufficiently rich to prove the result in its simplest form.
Part 2 of the paper introduces the model. Part three states the main result, and part four is a conclusion.
extensive form model of the firm. We consider a simple model with sufficient structure to highlight the main properties of interest. Let the budget constraints of the single agent as a consumer be
A consumption bundle x = (x(0), x(s)) is a collection of vectors defined on the strictly positive orthant R l(S+1) ++ with associated strictly positive price system p = (p(0), p(s)) in
. A financial quantity z (number of stocks) is a strictly positive real number R ++ with associated price system q in R ++ . We denote the initial resources of this economy ω = (ω(0), ω(1)) in R 2l ++ . Note that there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy, instead we consider firm specific risk. An uncertain state of nature is an element denoted s in the exhaustive set of mutually exclusive elements S. R(ȳ, s)z denotes the return of investment into the firm. The consumer invests into the firm in order to transfer wealth across time and between uncertain states of nature.
In a one agent model the agent also performs the role of the producer, and therefore, adds following variables to his constraints
wherek(0) denotes the capital purchased. Let aside the modeling of financing production for a while, therefore, let ξ = z +b, whereb is a feasible financial policy of the firm such thatb ⇒ Y |b . Here, take production set Y |b as given. This production set is available to the firm in period two. The consumer's budget set is defined by
The agent 's control problem is to choose (x; ξ, y) such that utility of consumption of goods is maximized. By reduced form, we mean a model where financial policies are not explicitly modeled and decisions of the agents not fully separated. We formally introduce the reduced form model below.
Definition 1 A reduced form equilibrium (p,q) with associated equilibrium allocations x;ξ,ȳ for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω satisfies:
Proposition 1 Let Y |ξ and Ξ be two nonempty convex sets. Then (ȳ,ξ) is a geometric solution of the reduced form problem (Def.1)
if and only if
By application of the separation theorem for convex sets (ȳ,ξ) is a solution of this control problem if and only if
where ∇ y denotes the gradient of v with respect to y, and ∇ ξ denotes the gradient of v with respect to ξ. From the definition of a normal cone (appendix) it follows that
and from the definition of the function v that
We now introduce the extensive form model, where decisions are fully decentralized and financial policies explicitly modeled. Consider the consumer's constraints
where qz is the value the consumer is willing to invest into the firm. θ(z)R(ȳ) denotes the proportional share of total dividend payoff the consumer receives in the next period. Denote the consumers budget set
As a producer, the agent issues stocks b satisfying qb = qz, buys capital k(0) such that income from selling stocks is equal to his expenditure on capital consumption, therefore, qb = p(0) · k(0). At t = 0, the producer's long run problem is to
where the level of capital, k(0), implies total production capacity available to the firm, a correspondence Φ|b . This correspondence in turn determines the production set available to the firm, denoted Y |b . Given this production set, and the set of states of nature, the producer's t = 1 short run problem is to
Inputs of production are financed with sells from outputs. The level of revenue a firm can generate in each state s ∈ {1, ..., S} depends on the available production set determined in the certain state of the world. We formally introduce the equilibrium definition of this model. Definition 2 (p,q) is a decentralized objective function extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations ((x,z) , ȳ,b ) for generic initial resources ω ∈ Ω, if for any feasibleb z following conditions are satisfied:
Proposition 2x|z is a solution of
if and only if,x|z ∈ B, and
is satisfied.
Proof 2 (proposition 2) (i)x|z is a solution of utility max (2) if and only ifx|z ∈ B and intUx |z ∩ B = ∅.
By the separation theorem for convex sets (appendix), there exists P = β i p ∈ R n , P = 0
By continuity of utility, intUx = Ux, and by continuity of the scalar product,
hence, there exists p such that ∂u(x|z) ∩ N B (x|z) = {0} is satisfied.
(ii) Suppose thatx|z ∈ B, and there exists P ∈ ∂u(x|z) ∩ N B (x|z), P = 0. Ifx|z is not a solution of the utility maximization problem (2) then there exists x'∈ intUx |z ∩ B. Since P ∈ ∂u(x|z), we have P · x > P ·x|z But since P ∈ N B (x|z) and x ∈ B, it follows that P · x ≤ P ·x|z which contradicts that x is preferred tox|z. 
Conclusion
The separation result introduced in this paper generalizes the profits maximization criterion of the Arrow-Debreu model to the case of incomplete markets. The novelty of this result is the independency of the objective function of the firm from the utility of the stock holders. This improves on the theory of the firm in incomplete markets where firms are considered to be utility maximizers [4] . In this paper we take a geometric approach to the separation theorem introduced in [7] by using convex analysis.
